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EMINENT DOMAIN - DISPOSITION OF AWARD WHEN LAND IS SUBJECT
TO LIFE EsTATE AND REMAINDER -Testator devised property to his adopted
daughter for life and remainder to her children, but should she leave no children
at her death, then the estate was to go to a named charity. The United States
took title to this property and paid the compensation into court. The life tenant
and one of the five children filed a motion that the life tenant be permitted to
withdraw the funds arising from the condemnation for the purpose of having
them immediately reinvested in other real estate and/or government securities.
This motion was approved by the guardian ad litem for the one infant remainderman. But the remaining three children objected to the granting of the motion and insisted that the proceeds be divided between the life tenant and the
remaindermen according to their respective interests, as might be determined by
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the use of life tables. Held, the proceeds should remain under the control of the
court to be reinvested in other suitable real estate, the title to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the will concerning the property condemned. In
ordering a reinvestment of the proceeds, the court reasoned that it was carrying
out the intent of the testator to provide a home for his adopted daughter for life,
and that since the remaindermen would not have had a right to the proceeds had
this been a judicial sale at their request,1 their rights should not be increased
merely because the government had taken the property. United States v. 380
Acres of Land, (D. C. Ky. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 6.
The problem of disposing of the condemnation award when the land is subject to a life estate and remainder interests is one capable of varied solutions.
This particular situation is generally not specifically provided for by statute,
Connecticut and Massachusetts being the exception. 2 Usually the condemnation
statute merely provides for serving notice upon the owners of various interests, 3
or there may be some general provision for making distribution of the proceeds to
the parties having regard to their respective interests. 4 The Kentucky statute is
of the latter type, making no specific provision for r·einvestment of the proceeds
in other property or for holding them in trust subject to the corresponding interests the parties held in the property. 5 In the absence of statutory direction, the
court must determine what is to be done with the award. It is not questioned
that the life tenant and remainderman is each entitled to damages for his own
estate. 6 Thus an immediate distribution of the proceeds may be made after
determining the share going to the holder of the life estate and that going to the
remaindermen. 7 With the application of life tables, the interest of the life tenant
, 1 Ky. Civil 'code of Practice (Carroll, 1938), §§ 491, 491a. Sec. 491 provides
that in an action by the owner of a particular estate of freehold in possession against
the owner of the reversion or remainder, the real property may be sold for investment
of the proceeds in other real property. Sec. 491a provides that remainder and contingent interests in real estate may be sold upon petitiQn of any person having a present .
or vested interest by making all persons having an interest in the estate parties to the
action. The proceeds are to be reinvested by the court in the same kind of property, to
be conveyed and held in the same manner, subject to like limitation, trust, and conditions, as the property which was sold, or in government bonds.
2 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), §5078; Mass. Gen. Laws (1933), c. 79, § 24; Boston v. Robbins, 121 Mass. 453 (1877).
3 Ga. Code Ann. (1935), §§ 36-304, 36-308,, 36~310; Tenn. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1938), § 3170 (4).
4 Tenn. Code Ann., (Michie, 1938), § 3170 (8); Va. Code Ann. (1942), §
4374. This section of the Virginia statute is typical of that found in mosntates: "After
the payment of the amount of compensation and damages into court . • • [ the owners]
shall have such interest or estate in the compensation or damages paid into court as
they had in the property so taken •.. and the court shall make such distribution of such
money as to it may seem right, having due regard to the interest of all persons therein,
whether such interest be vested, contingent or otherwise...."
5 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), §§ 416.010 to 416.090. Damages are paid to the owners
or into court. ,
6 Borough of Harrisburg v. Crangle, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 460 (1842); Stubbs v.
United States, (D. C. N. C. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 1007.
7 Pittsburg, Virginia & Charleston Ry. v. Bentley, 88 Pa. 178 (1878).
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can be found by taking the net annual value of the premises and multiplying it
by the years of the life tenant's expectancy of life. 8 If the remainder is contingent
or there is uncertainty as to who is or will be entitled to it, the value of the life
estate may be ascertained and paid to the life tenant and the balance impounded
until the shares of the remaindermen can be determined. 9 Other courts have
held that since the award takes the place of the property, there should be no
immediate apportionment, but rather the fund should be maintained intact with.
the life tenant and remainderman retaining the same interests in it which they
held in respect to the land.10 Another view is that the life tenant is entitled to
the use and possession of the entire fund for his life and that, in the absence of
statute, there is no power to compute the value of the life estate and to compel
the life tenant to take a gross sum representing such value out of the condemnation award. 11 However, the life tenant may be required to give adequate security
before receiving the principal of the award.12 In contrast, another court decided
that there is no authority whatsoever for paying the award to the tenant absolutely; and if it is paid to the tenant at all, the principal should first be secured
to the remaindermen.13 Some merit may be had in comparing the problem at
hand with that where land subject to a lease is condemned, in which case the
values of the reversion and the leasehold are determined and appropriate awards
made to the respective owners of the estates.14 And where land condemned was
held subject to a condition subsequent, the award was given to the holder of that
estate, but it was required to hold the award in a separate fund and to receive
only the interest from the fund so invested.15 Precedent is lacking for the decision in the principal case. Under the change of circumstances resulting from
the government's taking the land, other courts have not attempted to carry out
the intent of the testator to the extent of ordering a reinvestment of the proceeds
in similar land to be held subject to the same estates as the land condemned.
The court emphasized the proposition that had this been a judicial sale at the
request of either party, the proceeds would have been reinvested in similar property and that neither would have had a right to a share of them as such. But
inasmuch as the Kentucky condemnation statutes make no specific provision for
the disposition of the proceeds, it is questionable whether the provisions of the
8

Id.
Department of Public Works v. Porter, 327 Ill. 28, 158 N. E. 366 (1927);
Miller v. City of Asheville, II2 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765 (1893).
10
State ex rel. Scott v. Trimble, 308 Mo. 123, 272 S. W. 66 (1924) (fund was
awarded to life tenant for herself and as trustee for remainderman); In re Smith's Will,
170 Misc. 556, II N. Y. S. (2d) 945 (1939) (life tenant is trustee of fund and entitled to income therefrom).
11
Matter of Camp, 126 N. Y. 377, 27 N. E. 799 (1891).
12
1n re Gilroy, 60 Misc. 125,112 N. Y. S. 111 (1908),_affd. 194 N. Y. 551,
87 N. E. 1119 (1909).
.
18
Bartlow v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 243 Ill. 332, 90 N. E. 721 (1910).
14
City of Cincinnati v. Smythe, 57 Ohio App. 70, 11 N. E. (2d) 274 (1937)
(land was subject to a 99-year lease, renewable forever).
15
In re Cook's Will, 243 App. Div. 706, 277 N. Y. S. 26 (1936) (court said the
award took the place of the land and was subject to the same limitations to which the
real property represented by the award was subject).
9
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Civil Code of Practice relating to voluntary judicial sales at the request of either
party should have any application when the government has taken the land.
It)s at least interesting to note that similar provisions for the sale of land where
future interests exist are found in almost half of the states,16 yet no other court
appears to have treated their provisions as a guide in disposing of the fund arising upon the governmen.!'s taking the land by eminent domain. The reason behind a statute like that of Kentucky relating to a judicial sale at the request of
the life tenant or the remainderman is no doubt that neither should be permitted
to deprive the other of his estate in land as such. Thus the proceeds are reinvested. However, when the land is not sold at the request of the owner of either
estate, but rather is taken by the government, the reason, if it be such, for the
procedure set forth in the statute fails. The reliance on this statutory procedure
as a guide in the dissimilar circumstances of the principal case seems to dodge the
problem of determining the disposition of the condemnation award in the
absence of a specific provision in the condemnation statute itself.
Mary Jane Morris

16 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §179, noted (1936), stating, "statutes treating the
situation where the future interest exists as _to land and a sale of the complete ownership is sought, existed in ••• twenty-three jurisdictions."

